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Abstract: Crump et al. (2022) offer a well-argued example of an essential development: a
rigorous framework for assessing sentience from the perspective of moral concern over an
agent’s welfare. Current and forthcoming developments in bioengineering, synthetic
morphology, artificial intelligence, biorobotics, and exobiology necessitate an expansion and
generalization of this effort. Verbal reports (the Turing Test) and homology to human brains
are utterly inadequate criteria for assessing the status of novel, unconventional agents that
offer no familiar touchstone of phylogeny or anatomy. We must develop principled
approaches to evaluating the sentience of (and thus, our responsibility to) beings of unfamiliar
provenance and composition.
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1. Context and scope: evaluating sentience. Crump et al. (2022) provide a welcome
contribution to a pressing problem, which stands at the heart of two difficult issues occupying
mankind for millennia: the problem of other minds, and the challenge of establishing
instructive norms based on scientific data (“deriving ought from is”). What degree of concern
and care should we exhibit toward the many diverse agents around us, and what criteria do
we use to identify sentience, capacity for suffering, and other properties that have moral
implications?
Crump et al.’s contribution is practical, quantitative, and grounded in empirical data.
It does not address the Hard Problem – why any of the functional/structural criteria they lay
out should be associated with feeling (Chalmers, 1996; Nagel, 1986), but this problem is likely
unsolvable in 3rd person and should not stand as a barrier to progress. As they correctly point
out, demanding certainty in this case is inappropriate, and we should err on the side of
reducing false negatives with respect to sentience criteria for ethical concern.
The essential contribution of Crump et al. is to lay out an example of a set of rigorous,
flexible criteria for making judgements in specific cases. Their framework is ideally adapted to
a wide range of natural biological species. Moreover, they explicitly highlight the fact that the
criteria for concern should not require 2nd order abilities of creatures to reflect on their
feelings (an especially advanced region of the cognitive continuum). This is an important link
to the field of “minimal cognition”, which studies the evolutionary origins (primitive versions)
of familiar, complex cognitive capacities in models such as bacteria, slime moulds, somatic
tissues, plants, etc. (Levin et al., 2021; Lyon, 2006; Lyon, 2020; Lyon et al., 2021).
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Here, I briefly discuss this kind of effort from a wider perspective, beyond the ethology
of natural kinds in the biosphere.
2. Endless “Forms Most Beautiful” 2.0: the space of possible beings. One of Darwin’s
enormous impacts was to show how the familiar distinction of humans vs. mere animals was
but a poor coarse-graining (binarization) of a continuum. This axis links the simplest chemical
replicators to humans in a gradual, continuous manner. Similarly, developmental biology
reveals how each of us, uncontroversially sentient beings, morphed slowly and gradually from
the “just physics” of a quiescent oocyte cell to a human-level mind (Levin, 2019). These 1dimensional phylogenetic and ontogenetic life histories, however, are just the beginning of a
revolution that was perhaps unimaginable in Darwin’s day (Levin, 2020).
We stand at the entry point to a great transition, in which all of Darwin’s familiar
“Forms Most Beautiful” (Darwin, 1859) are just a tiny region of an astronomically large space
of possible beings. Already, the merger of living tissue and smart materials are giving rise to
a variety of cyborgs (Orive et al., 2020; Pio-Lopez, 2021) - humans with novel sensors,
prosthetic limbs and device control that implements Clark & Chalmers’s (1998) “Extended
Mind” Hypothesis, and smart implants that modulate cognitive function. Chimeric
technologies, biorobotics, and evolutionary strategies used in robotics are blurring the line
between evolved and designed agents – organisms and machines (Bongard and Levin, 2021).
Closed-loop platforms integrating both biological and machine learning components, and
“hybrots” (cultured brains with robotic bodies), are revealing the proto-cognitive capacities
of cells and tissues in novel configurations (Bakkum et al., 2007; DeMarse and Dockendorf,
2005; Kagan et al., 2021; Potter et al., 2005). Bioengineering and synthetic morphology are
giving rise to coherent, autonomous “beings” that have anatomies, cellular composition, and
control structures that are radically different from any existing life form (Blackiston et al.,
2021; Ebrahimkhani and Levin, 2021; Kriegman et al., 2020). Because of the tremendous
interoperability and plasticity of life, every combination of evolved material (genes, cells,
tissues), designed materials, and software is a viable agent and a possible embodiment of
sentience (Clawson and Levin, 2022).
Moreover, the field of AI (whether purely software or embodied) is already producing
agents with extremely sophisticated performance in linguistic space, while the field of
minimal cognition is revealing competences and intelligence in other problem spaces (such as
physiological, metabolic, transcriptional, and anatomical). While some of the AIs are able to
advocate for themselves verbally (leaving aside the question of whether this behaviour is
appropriately grounded or “just faking it”), the bioengineered forms behave in problem
spaces we do not normally recognize as intelligent or sentient and do not give verbal reports
(this includes cells, organs, and one of your brain hemispheres). It is clear that the human
capacity to recognize and evaluate agency is well-tuned for medium sized objects doing
interesting things at medium speeds in 3D space, but it is not well adapted to recognizing
intelligence and competences in unfamiliar guises and problem spaces (Fields and Levin,
2022).
The coming decades will introduce into society, into our homes, and into our bodies a
plethora of novel agents which offer none of the familiar touchstones we have used in the
past for gauging moral responsibility toward a given agent: where it came from (factory or
evolution) and what it looks like (anatomical structure and homology to humans). Those
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simplistic criteria were never appropriate. They were heuristics suitable only for past
limitations of imagination and technical capability. It is essential now to develop frameworks
that pick out what is deep and fundamental about sentient beings – not frozen accidents of
evolution on the N=1 example of the phylogenetic path of life on Earth.
3. The future: frameworks for truly diverse intelligences. The Smith & Boyd (1991) criteria
are irrelevant across the vast majority of the space of possible agents. Crump et al. use the
example of an invertebrate brain (which “differs radically” from our own) to start to stretch
these considerations in important ways. Their criterion #7 (associative learning) can occur
even in gene regulatory networks (Biswas et al., 2021; Fernando et al., 2009; McGregor et al.,
2012; Watson et al., 2010), and most of their other criteria are met by non-neural
morphogenetic agents (Friston et al., 2015; Pezzulo and Levin, 2015) via a simple pivot of
some of the terms away from “neurons” toward the more general “electrically active cell”.
Some of the others (e.g, #8, analgesia preference) form excellent suggestions for future work
in non-neural systems and are currently being studied in morphogenetic agents.
1. Nociception
2. Sensory integration
3. Integrated nociception
4. Analgesia: (a) endogenous (b) exogenous
5. Motivational trade-offs
6. Flexible self-protection
7. Associative Learning
8. Analgesia preference: (a) self-administer (b) location (c) prioritised

Crump et al.’s (2022) eight criteria (section 2.2)

Although exo-biology has not yet challenged us with true alien beings, science fiction has been
ahead of the game for many decades, warning us about the lack of appropriate frameworks
for gauging sentience. The current debate over the sentience of LaMDA (Thopilian et al., 2022)
and similar large language models in AI is a case in point. Many have offered very strong
opinions about whether LaMDA is or is not sentient, but no one has a good set of criteria that
can be used to make such distinctions. If Turing-Test-like evidence is insufficient, so is brain
homology. We can’t possibly expect that the only sentient life in the universe has mammalianstyle brains; if we can’t agree on intelligence in plants (Calvo et al., 2020; Calvo et al., 2017),
and are still wrangling over when and how a “sentience-free” chemistry of the oocyte
becomes a human mind, we can have no strong confidence about unconventional agents.
Verbal reports (i.e., language), homology of structure or materials, phylogenetic
provenance, etc. are all insufficient to make dependable conclusions across the space of
possible agents, some of which will be truly alien in the most crucial ways. And yet, we have
an ethical imperative to develop frameworks that recognize sentience beyond our limitations
and familiarities. Quantitative criteria like those of Crump et al. are a good example of the
kind of framework we need: explicitly laying out conditions in a way that reveals their value
and limitations. We will not have certainty, but if we dissolve arbitrary criteria and search for
deep invariants across all possible minds and bodies, we will have a morally defensible
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position. Maturing to the point of a principled stance on sentience and agency is probably an
existential requirement for humankind – in its current embodiment and in the inevitable
future ones.
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